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Receivables Financing and the Conflict
of Laws: The UNCITRAL Draft
Convention on the Assignment of
Receivables in International Trade
Catherine Walsh*
In a country a great part of whose commercial capital is
employed abroad, it is particularly proper that such capital over
which the trader has disposing power although situated out of the
Kingdom, should be considered as referable to the domicilium of
the owner.'
I. Introduction
Private international law solutions to legal problems created by
differences among legal systems are often distrusted. Instead of a
substantive solution, a choice of law rule merely provides a signpost
-and not always a clear one -to the source where the solution may
be found. Moreover, a solution incubated in a domestic factual
* Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada; email
catherine.walsh@mcgill.ca. The author was a member of the Canadian delegation
to the Working Group charged with developing the UNCITRAL Draft
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade which is the
focus of this paper. The text of the Draft Convention appears in annex 1 of the
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on its thirty-
fourth session 25 June-13 July 2001, Doc A/56/17. To view or print the report and
annex, go to the UNCITRAL web site at www.uncitral.org and follow the links to
the 34th Annual Session. The other Canadian representatives to the Working
Group were Michel Deschamps, a partner in the Montreal office of McCarthy,
Tetrault, and Kathryn Sabo, Senior Counsel in the Public Law Policy Section of
the Department of Justice in Ottawa. Although I am indebted to these colleagues
for sharing their expertise and experience, the views expressed here do not
necessarily reflect theirs, nor do they represent the official position of the
government of Canada. I am, of course, solely responsible for all errors and
omissions.
1. Philips v. Hunter (1795) 2 G, Blackst., 402, 406, as quoted by MARTIN
WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 510-511 (2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1950).
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and legal context may not prove appropriate or workable beyond
local borders.
Distrust of private international law is matched by distrust of
the private international lawyer. Although considered a speciality
in itself, private international law covers the entire spectrum of
private law. As such, it requires the skills of the generalist. Yet a
generalist may not be sufficiently attuned to the practical contexts
in which a conflicts rule must operate to recognize when a
theoretically defensible solution may turn out to be unworkable.
On the other hand, to leave the matter exclusively to the
substantive law specialist risks undermining carefully cultivated
general conflicts norms.
In the area of assignment2of receivables, the challenges are
particularly fearsome.3 The assignment matrix is a complex one,
involving not one but two sets of contractual relations; the original
contract between the assignor and debtor which generates the
assigned receivable and the contract between the assignor and
assignee by which the assignment of that receivable is
accomplished.
From a choice of law perspective, the original contract and the
contract of assignment are sufficiently independent to justify
subjecting each to its own proper law. But what of the impact of
the assignment on the debtor? Should this be governed by the
proper law of the contract of assignment or the original contract?
Is a contract-based choice of law approach even appropriate?
Consensus, after all, is the essence of contract, and the assignee/
2. In this paper, the term "assignment" is used in the same broad way as in
the Draft Convention; it covers both the outright transfer or sale of receivables,
and the creation of rights in receivables as security for debt (article 2(a)). At the
conflict of laws level, there is no rational reason to distinguish between the two
types of transactions. Indeed, such a distinction would make the conflicts regime
unworkable. See further the discussion later in the text under the sub-heading
"Characterization of assignments as sale or security."
3. On choice of law for assignment, see, in particular Henri Batiffol,
Assignment (Cession de cr~ance) in LECTURES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (delivered at the Summer Institute on International
and Comparative Law, University of Michigan Law School, August 5-20, 1949)
(Buffalo: William S. Hein, 1982); RoY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 1107-1130,
especially 1126-1130 (2d ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995); Mark Moshinksy,
The Assignment of Debt in the Conflict of Laws 109 L.Q.R. 591 (1992); Teun H.D.
Struycken, The Proprietary Aspects of International Assignments and the Rome
Convention, Article 12, L.M.C.L.Q. 345 (1998); MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 502-576 (2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1950); Note, 67 YALE
L.J. 402 (1958).
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debtor relationship is typically an involuntary one from the
debtor's perspective.
The dual juridical nature of the assigned debt adds a further
layer of complexity. From the perspective of the debtor/assignor
relationship, the debt is purely a personal obligation-the debtor's
creditor does not own the debt, the creditor is owed it. But it
becomes a species of property when the original creditor assigns the
right to payment to another.4 As with any contract involving the
divestment of property rights in favour of another, competing third
party claimants may enter the picture: the recipient of a competing
assignment, attaching creditors of the assignor, or the assignor's
insolvency administrator. This makes a contractual approach
inappropriate because freedom of contract ends where third party
rights begin both in substantive law and in the conflict of laws. Yet
solutions drawn from choice of law for property, where the lex situs
dominates, are not readily transplanted to a right which lacks a
corporeal object, and therefore a physical situs.
Early conflicts analysts sought to impose simplicity on this web
of complexity through a unitary choice of law rule. Drawing on the
medieval continental maxims mobilia sequuntur personam (mov-
ables follow the person), and mobilia ossibus inhaerent (movables
inhere in the bones), they advocated application of the law of the
domicile of the assignor, as the original "owner" of the debt For
reasons which will emerge, the assignor's location is enjoying a
deserved revitalization as the paramount connecting factor for the
choice of law to govern assignments of receivables. But as the
exclusive connecting factor for all issues, it insufficiently respects
4. I am using the concept of property (proprietg) here in the comprehensive
sense of English and French law. Some legal traditions restrict the equivalent term
to rights in land and corporeal and quasi-corporeal movables, finding juris-
prudential difficulty in assigning the status of a right in re to a right which has no
object independent of the personal relationship of obligation which generates it:
see Wolfgang Mincke, Property: Assets or Power? Objects or Relations as the
Substrata of Property Rights 78-88 in PROPERTY PROBLEMS: FROM GENES TO
PENSION FUNDS (J.W. Harris, ed., Kluwer Law International, 1997). While it is
everywhere recognized that the creditor is enriched by another's indebtedness, and
that the value of that debt must be to some degree transferrable, conceptual
differences in the characterization of an assigned debt have contributed to
difficulties in achieving international consensus in the conflict of laws rules
applicable to assignment: see, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 3, at 537,539.
5. See WOLFF, supra note 3, at 539-40; see also Moshinsky, supra note 3, at
591 (citing Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1834) in footnote
2). This choice of law approach is reflected in the quote from the 1795 English
decision in Phillips v. Hunter, supra note 1, which precedes the text of this article.
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the debtor's interests and imposes unnecessary restrictions on
freedom of contract between the assignor and assignee.
Later writers advocated a more pluralistic approach in which
the different issues that may arise within the assignment matrix are
each assigned the connecting factor for choice of law most
appropriate for that issue.6 While a pluralistic approach has
attracted wide support, consensus on which issues should be
assigned to what law has proved frustratingly elusive. It is no
exaggeration to say that the area continues to be the most confused
and confusing in the conflict of laws regimes of legal systems
everywhere.7
The bifurcated rule in Article 12 of the European Convention
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations ("Rome
Convention"), initially seemed to promise the beginning of inter-
national consensus.8 Paragraph 12(1) refers the mutual obligations
of the assignor and assignee to the proper law of the contract
between them,9 while paragraph 12(2) refers issues relating to the
impact of the assignment on the debtor to the "law governing the
receivable."'"
However, article 12 has proved to be more a vehicle for
disharmony than harmony. There is little agreement not just
among, but even within, Rome Convention states on its meaning
and scope. The major source of contention is whether article 12
applies to the property effects of assignments and the assignee's
priority status against third parties, and, if so, which of its two
branches contains the appropriate rule. On its face, article 12 does
not explicitly address either issue. However, some regard article
6. In the English conflict of laws, this approach is associated with the late Dr.
John Morris circa 1949: see Moshinsky, supra note 3, at 592.
7. See, e.g., Struycken, supra note 3, at 345 ("The assignment of debts belongs
to the most hazardous areas of private international law."); see also Moshinsky,
supra note 3, at 59 ( "The assignment of intangible things, such as debts, has long
been one of the most intractable topics in the English conflict of laws. The writers
on the subject are fundamentally divided and the little case law that exists is old,
confused and inconclusive.").
8. See generally Giuliano & Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 O.J. (C282) (October 31, 1980).
9. 12(1): "The mutual obligations of assignor and assignee under a voluntary
assignment of a right against another person ('the debtor') shall be governed by
the law which under this Convention applies to the contract between the assignor
and assignee."
10. 12(2): "The law governing the right to which the assignment relates shall
determine its assignability, the relationship between the assignee and the debtor,
the conditions under which the assignment can be invoked against the debtor and
any question whether the debtor's obligations have been discharged."
11. See Struycken, supra note 3, at 348-49.
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12(1), insofar as it refers "the mutual obligations of the assignor and
assignee" to the proper law of the contract between them, as
thereby also determinative of the law applicable to the relative
property rights acquired by subsequent third parties claiming
through the assignor. 12 Others believe that article 12(2), insofar as
it addresses issues of assignability and the assignee's right to
payment from the debtor, as also determinative of priority among
several assignees.13
Disharmony in choice of law for assignment frustrates both
commercial and conflicts values. 4  Conflicts values favouring
uniformity of result in transnational litigation are defeated because
the applicable law will vary depending on the forum of litigation."
And commercial values are undermined because the relevant
actors, not being able to predict with certainty where future
litigation concerning the assignment may take place, cannot predict
which state's choice of law rule will control. Consequently, they
must structure the transaction to conform to the substantive laws of
all potentially connected jurisdictions, a burden which inevitably
restricts access to financing, and increases its cost.
In hindsight, it may have been a mistake to bring unification of
the conflicts rules for assignment within the scope of the Rome
Convention. A project devoted to choice of law for contracts in
general was unlikely to deal adequately or appropriately with a
species of contract in which the proprietary issues predominate,
both legally and from a commercial risk assessment perspective.
12. This interpretation has been endorsed by the highest court in the
Netherlands: Brandsma q.q. v. Hansa Chemie AG, HR, May 16, 1997,
Rechtspraak van de Week 126, as cited and summarized by Struycken, supra note
3.
13. This interpretation has been endorsed by the highest German court: BGH
8.12.1998, XI ZR 302/97 (WM 1999, 126 = ZIP 1999, 101 = NJW 1999, 940 (on file
with author); see Struycken, supra note 3, at 349.
14. See Note, supra note 3, at 421-22.
15. Uniformity of result as a paramount value is contentious in the conflicts
scholarship. If a lts is connected sufficiently to a state to justify adjudication there,
why should that state's ideas of substantive justice not also control the selection of
the most appropriate law to govern? For a recent discussion, see, e.g., Catherine
Walsh, Territoriality and Choice of Law in the Supreme Court of Canada:
Applications in Products Liability Claims 76 CAN. BAR. REV. 91-129 (1997),
republished in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW 237-272 (Jacob S. Ziegel & Shalom Lerner, eds. Oxford: Hart,
1998). Whatever the relevance of that debate in other areas, notably tort, surely
substantive justice equates with uniform choice of law in the commercial
receivables financing sphere, in view of the deleterious impact of disharmony on
the cost and availability of credit and capital.
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Now comes the Draft United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Convention on the
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade ("Convention" or
"UNCITRAL Convention"), approved by the Commission at its
2001 annual Session and submitted to the General Assembly for
adoption as a United Nations Convention, a process which is
expected by be concluded by the end of 2001.16 The bulk of the
Convention is devoted to stating international substantive rules for
assignments within its scope. However, it adopts a choice of law
solution for the critical issue of the priority of the assignee's right in
the assigned receivable against competing claimants. 7 In addition,
Chapter V incorporates a more comprehensive "mini-convention"
on the choice of law rules for receivables financing. With some
important refinements discussed later, Chapter V follows article 12
of the Rome Convention on the appropriate law to govern
assignor/assignee and assignee/debtor relations, with the former
governed by the proper law of the contract of assignment,'8 and the
latter by the law governing the original contract which generated
the receivable.19 However, parallelling the choice of law rule in the
main text of the Convention, Chapter V adopts a separate
connecting factor for priorities-the law of the assignor's location."
It also states a specialized rule for the law applicable to the form of
a contract of assignment which is compatible with the general
Rome Convention rule on contract formalities.21
This paper presents a general overview of the conflicts rules
incorporated into the Draft Convention and their justifications. In
general, it will be seen that the regime promises to bring a welcome
level of appropriate order to an area of private international law
badly in need of it. As such, it demonstrates the happy results of
marrying general conflicts analysis with substantive commercial law
expertise. However, several problem areas are identified where
application of the rules will require a practised hand, or where
Contracting States may need to adjust aspects of their existing
16. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
on its thirty-fourth session, 25 June-13 July 2001, Doc. A/56/17, p.38 para 200. The
text of the Draft Convention appears in annex 1 of the Report To view or print the
Report or annex, go to the UNCITRAL web site at www.uncitral.org and follow
the links to the 34th Annual Session of the Commission.
17. UNCITRAL Convention article 22.
18. UNCITRAL Convention article 28.
19. UNCITRAL Convention article 29.
20. UNCITRAL Convention article 30.
21. UNCITRAL Convention article 27.
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national law regimes if the intended goals of enhanced certainty
and predictability are to be realized.
II. Scope of Application of the Conflicts Rules of the Convention
Before analysing the choice of law rules established in the
Convention, it is important to understand the differences in the
scope of application of the choice of law rule for priority in article
22 of the main text of the Convention and the more comprehensive
conflicts "mini-convention" found in Chapter V.
The choice of law rule for priority in article 22 applies to all
assignments which come within the general scope of application of
the Convention. For the Convention to apply, an assignment must
first satisfy the criteria for "internationality." Internationality exists
if either the assignment is international-i.e. the assignor and the
assignee are located in different States-or the assigned receivable
is international--i.e. the assignor and the debtor on the assigned
receivable are located in different states.22
Even if an assignment qualifies under these criteria, the
Convention applies generally only if the assignor is located in a
Contracting State.23 There is one further territorial qualification.
This relates to those provisions of the Convention which affect the
debtor's rights and obligations. These provisions remain inapplic-
able, even if the assignor is located in a Contracting State, unless
the debtor is also located in a Contracting State, or the law
governing the original contract between the assignor and debtor is
the law of a Contracting State.24
It bears emphasizing that the threshold requirement for
internationality does not mean that assignees under a purely
domestic assignment can safely ignore the Convention. First, the
Convention, including the choice of law rule for priority in article
22, extends to subsequent sub-assignments, if any prior assignment
is governed by the Convention, and to subsequent sub-assignments
to which the Convention applies even if it did not independently
apply to a prior assignment of the same receivable. 5 Second, the
choice of law rule for priority in article 22 applies to any dispute
between the right of an assignee under an assignment governed by
the Convention and a competing claimant. Competing claimant for
this purpose is defined to include, in addition to the assignor's
22. UNCITRAL Convention article 3.
23. UNCITRAL Convention article 1.1(a).
24. UNCITRAL Convention article 1.3.
25. UNCITRAL Convention articles 1.1(b) and 1.2.
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creditors and insolvency administrator, another assignee of the
same receivable from the same assignor, even if the assignment
under which the competing assignee claims does not independently
satisfy the criteria for internationality.2 6 The definition also includes
a claimant who asserts a right in the receivable by operation of law
by virtue of having a prior right in an asset which generated the
assigned receivable.27 This latter category is meant to recognize
that under some national laws, a claimant may have a right to
receivables as proceeds of a security right in other assets which
have been disposed of by the debtor; in effect these legal systems
effect an automatic assignment of all proceeds, including receiv-
ables, generated by the debtor's disposition of property in which
the claimant initially held security.28
Application of the more comprehensive "mini-convention" in
Chapter V is likewise limited to assignments that satisfy the
Convention's criteria of "internationality. '"2 9 However, the role of
Chapter V varies depending on whether or not the assignment falls
within the direct scope of the Convention under the criteria just
outlined."
For assignments within the direct scope of the Convention,
Chapter V plays only a supplementary or "gap filling" role.31 It
operates to designate the law applicable to those matters for which
the main body of the Convention does not supply a direct solution,
either expressly or by appealing to the general principles on which
it is based.32  The main body of the Convention provides a
substantive rule for most important issues that might arise between
the assignor and the assignee,33 or between the assignee and the
debtor,34 and, for issues of priority, there is the independently
applicable choice of law rule for priority in article 22.
26. UNCITRAL Convention article 5(m)(i).
27. UNCITRAL Convention article 5(m)(i).
28. An automatic statutory security right in the identifiable proceeds of a
disposition or dealing in the property originally charged with security is primarily
associated with the secured transactions regimes established by Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in the United States and by the Personal
Property Security Acts (PPSAs) enacted by Canada's common law provinces and
three federal territories. See U.C.C. revised Article § 9-315(2); and, for the PPSAs,
see, e.g., Ontario PPSA section 25(1)(b), section 1(definition of proceeds).
29. UNCITRAL Convention articles 1.1(a), 1.4, 26.
30. UNCITRAL Convention article 26.
31. UNCITRAL Convention article 26(b).
32. UNCITRAL Convention articles 26(b) and 7.2.
33. UNCITRAL Convention see primarily Chapter III; Chapter IV, Section 1.
34. UNCITRAL Convention see primarily Chapter IV, Section II.
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Consequently, Chapter V will play only a limited role in the case of
assignments within the direct scope of the Convention.
However, it may happen that litigation involving an assignment
which satisfies the criteria of internationality is heard in a
contracting State but the application of the Convention is not
triggered. It follows from the scope criteria summarized above that
this may occur whenever the assignee, but not the assignor, is
located in a Contracting State, or whenever the litigation relates to
the debtor's rights and obligations, and the debtor is not located in
a Contracting State nor is the original contract governed by the law
of a Contracting State. In such cases, Chapter V is meant to add an
additional layer of international harmony by providing an inde-
pendently applicable uniform conflicts regime (albeit one subject to
an opt-out by Contracting States) to determine the applicable law.35
III. Choice of Law for Priority
A. Introduction: Why not a uniform substantive law solution?
As the experience under the Rome Convention attests,36 the
most controversial choice of law issue in the area of assignment
concerns the appropriate law to govern the priority of the assignee's
interest against competing assignees and the assignor's creditors or
insolvency administrator. Not surprisingly, priority is also the issue
on which there is the greatest range of difference among legal
systems at the substantive level. All systems adopt a first-in-time
rule, at least as a starting point, but differ on the relevant event.37
In some systems, priority turns simply on when the first
assignee reached agreement with the assignor.3" This is based on
pure property doctrine: after the assignor's rights are vested in the
assignee under the first assignment, there is nothing left that the
assignor can transfer or that the assignor's creditors or insolvency
administrator can attach. However, uniformity even among states
35. UNCITRAL Convention articles 26(a), 1.4.
36. See supra text beginning at note 8.
37. See generally Hein Kotz, Rights of Third Parties: Third Party Beneficiaries
and Assignment, Chap 13, Vol VII 93-99, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW (J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),Tubingen,and Martinus Nijhoff,
Dorderecht, Boston, Lancaster: 1990); see also SECURITY ON MOVABLE PROPERTY
AND RECEIVABLES IN EUROPE: THE PRINCIPAL FORMS OF SECURITY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXCEPT GREECE AND SWITZERLAND (Michael G. Dickson
et al. eds., Oxford: ESC Publishing Limited, 1988).
38. See K6tz, supra note 37, at 97. This rule is associated with German,
Austrian and Swiss law.
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adopting this technique is undercut by non-uniform exceptions.
Some regimes, for instance, impose special additional requirements
in the case of assignments for security purposes.39 In others, the
prominent example being German law, a first-in-time bank-
assignee of a general bulk assignment may be subordinated to a
subsequent inventory supplier who takes an assignment of the
receivables arising on the assignor's authorized resale of the
inventory.n
In other systems, an assignment is not effective against third
parties until the debtor is either notified of or accepts the
assignment, and the first assignee to give notice prevails.4" The
notification theory of priority is justified on two complementary
rationales: notice to the debtor is the closest functional equivalent
for intangibles to the general rule that title to tangible goods passes
on physical delivery; and the rule enables a prospective assignee or
interested creditor to assess their priority risk by inquiry of debtor
as to whether there have been any previous notices. Again,
however, systems that agree on this general rule do not necessarily
agree on the appropriate exceptions, 3 or some have legislated
39. E.g., in Austria, an assignment for security purposes is not effective unless
accompanied by an "overt act" of publicity, e.g., notification of the debtor or an
entry in the assignor's books: see K6tz, supra note 37, at 98.
40. This qualification exists in German law as a result of court decisions. It is
said to be based on the theory that where a business makes a bulk assignment of
future receivables to a bank in circumstances where both parties ought to know
that the assignor's inventory suppliers will refuse to supply without an assignment
of the accounts arising on the sale of the inventory, the assignment constitutes a
fraud on the suppliers and is invalid as unconscionable or against public policy
pursuant to general codal values. The exception does not apply where these
conditions do not exist, or where the bank loan was made specifically for inventory
financing purposes, or where a suitably crafted clause in the bank assignment
documentation proves successful. Note that the German courts have also ruled
that the supplier/assignee may be subordinated in turn to either a prior or a
subsequent assignee of the same receivables who purchases the receivables under a
non-recourse bulk factoring agreement. See Kotz, supra note 37, at 98-99; see also
Jens Hausman, The Value of Public-Notice Filing Under Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9: A Comparison with the German Legal System of Securities in
Personal Property, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 427 (1996).
41. This is the position in French law which requires notice or acceptance to be
given in the form prescribed by the Civil Code. The French rule is considered to
be representative on this point of the Romanistic systems. In the Scandinavian
systems, and in English common law (based on the rule in Dearle v. Hall (1828) 38
E,R, 475, 492), the validity of the assignment against third parties likewise depends
on the notification of the debtor and competing assignees are ranked according to
the order of notification. See Kbtz, supra note 37, at 94-96.
42. See Kbtz, supra note 37, at 95; see also GOODE, supra note 3, at 705.
43. For instance, in England and France, the first assignee to give notice is
subordinated if there is evidence the assignee knew at the time of the assignment
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partial alternatives, as in the case of the Loi Dailly in France," and
the fragmented statutory registration regimes available in
England .45
In still other systems, notice of an assignment must be
registered in a public registry to take effect against third parties,
and ranking among successive assignees depends on the order of
registration.4 ' The rationale for this approach is obvious: a public
registry for giving notice of an assignment protects assignees by
enabling them to preserve their priority status through timely
registration, and it protects third parties by providing an objective
accessible means for them to find out about prior assignments.
Once again, however, matters are not so simple, and there is
disagreement among systems adopting a first-to-register rule on the
appropriate exceptions.47
that the claim had already been assigned to a prior assignee who has not yet
notified the debtor. The law of the Scandinavian countries does not recognize any
equivalent exception. See K6tz, supra note 37, at 95.
44. Loi Dailly (named for its principal promoter)-Law no. 81-1 facilitating
the granting of credit to enterprises (Loi facilitant le credit aux enterprises) of Jan.
2, 1981, JO 3 Jan p. 150. The Loi Dailly provides for the ongoing bulk transfer or
accounts, both outright (cession) or as security (nantissement) by the delivery of a
schedule or memorandum (bordereau) listing the accounts in prescribed form and
signed by the assignor. The Loi Dailly was modified by the Law of Jan. 23, 1984 to
provide explicitly for the assignability of future receivables even though the
amount and the debtors are not yet determined. See Kotz, supra note 37, at 80, 94-
95; see also Sidney Posel, Factoring Accounts Receivable in France: Some Legal
Aspects and American Comparisons, 57 TUL. L. REV. 282 (1982).
45. In England, the first-to-give notice priority rule is effectively displaced
when a prior assignment is registrable, and is in fact registered, on the theory that
the second assignee is then presumed to have notice of the prior registered
assignment. However, registration is not comprehensively available. A charge on
the book debts of a company can be registered under the Companies Act 1985, but
the Act does not extend to an outright sale of the book debts or to other kinds of
receivables or intangibles. A general assignment of book debts by a sole
proprietor or partnership can be registered as if it were a bill of sale but this is not
possible for specific assignments (debts due from specified debtors or under
specified contracts). See GOODE, supra note 3, at 705.
46. This is the general rule under the Personal Property Security Acts in effect
in the Canadian common law provinces and three federal territories: see, e.g.,
Ontario PPSA, sections 20(1) and 30(1). It is also the general rule under Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States which greatly influenced
the Canadian PPSAs: see U.C.C. §9-322(a) (2000). The recently-enacted New
Zealand Personal Property Securities Act 1999 is based on the Canadian PPSAs
and adopts the same general rule in s. 66.
47. For instance, while the Canadian PPSAs and Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code share much commonality in their registration-based priority
rules, revised Article 9 (2000) contains many more exceptions than its Canadian
counterparts, including assignments of deposit accounts (where a concept of
'control' generally substitutes for registration-based priority under § 9-312, § 9-314,
§ 9-327) and the outright assignment (sale) of "payment intangibles" i.e. loan
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The Working Group charged with preparing the draft
Convention initially favoured a uniform substantive rule for
priority. However, there was no consensus on what that rule should
be. The Group explored the possibility of a registration-based
priority rule supported by an international registry for filing notices
of assignments. But states without an equivalent domestic priority
theory were unwilling to take the radical step of endorsing that
theory at the international level. Nor could such a regime have
been confined to the international level since otherwise it would
have been incapable of resolving priority between an assignment
which met the criteria of internationality and a completely domestic
assignment. Indeed, even states with a strong commitment to a
general registration-based priority theory would not have been
likely to endorse that solution at the international level without
reserving the right to preserve their own diverse exceptions and
qualifications under national law.
Faute de mieux, the Convention instead attempts international
uniformity only at the choice of law level. It is true that the Annex
to the Convention still provides for the possibility of a substantive
priority regime based on registration. Section I of the Annex
contemplates a simple time of registration priority rule, while
Section II leaves open the possible future establishment of an
international registry for the filing of data about assignments
governed by the Convention. However, both sections operate
purely on an opt-in basis by interested Contracting States.48
Moreover, a State may instead decide to opt-in to the priority
regime in Section III of the Annex (priority based on the time of
the contract of the assignment) or Section IV (priority based on the
time of notification of the assignment to the debtor). Even if the
registration-based priority option is selected, States are free to
declare non-uniform exceptions pursuant to article 42, and may
develop and designate a domestic registry for filing notices of
assignments as a substitute for the international registry.
In other words, the Annex essentially codifies the current
diversity in substantive priority regimes among different legal
systems.49 Since it does nothing to achieve international substantive
uniformity, it is unlikely that its provisions will be adopted by
receivables other than credit card receivables (automatically effective without
registration under § 9-309). See generally Ronald C.C. Cuming and Catherine
Walsh, Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Implications for the
Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 16 B.F.L.R. 339 (2001).
48. UNCITRAL Convention article 42.
49. See supra text beginning at note 37.
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Contracting States. This leaves the choice of law rule in the
Convention as the principal hope for enhancing legal certainty and
predictability in international receivables financing.
B. Application of the Law of the Assignor's State to Priority
Under article 22 of the Convention, the priority of an
assignee's right in the assigned receivable against competing
claimants is referred to the law of the State in which the assignor is
located.' The reasons why the assignor's location was thought to
be the most appropriate connecting factor in the receivables
financing context are best revealed by comparing it to the possible
alternatives.
The proper law of the contract of assignment is clearly
unacceptable. The only virtue of deferring priority to that law
would be to empower the assignor to escape from an overly rigid
domestic regime by including a choice of law clause in the
assignment contract in favour of the law of a State with a more
sympathetic receivables financing law. This motivation may be the
realist subtext which explains the startling decision of the highest
court in the Netherlands to interpret article 12(1) of the Rome
Convention as intended to give the assignor and assignee
unrestricted freedom to choose the governing law for the purposes
of determining the effectiveness of the assignment against the
assignor's insolvency administrator. 1 The effect of the court's
decision was to apply German law so as to preserve the priority of
an assignment in favour of a German assignee in Dutch insolvency
proceedings despite the fact that the assignor was Dutch, and the
assigned debt was governed by Dutch law and owed by a Dutch
debtor.
As the Netherlands decision demonstrates, the effect of giving
the assignor and assignee unqualified freedom to choose the law
governing the priority of their assignment against third parties
enables them to evade mandatory limitations on assignment of the
most closely connected law. The regime governing assignments in
the new Dutch Civil Code of 1992 has been subjected to widespread
criticism as inimical to modern receivables financing practices, and
it has naturally been speculated that the court saw contractual
choice as an attractive means of escape. But whether or not one
50. Article 30.1 replicates the same rule for the purposes of the mini-
convention on conflict of laws contained in Chapter V of the Convention.
51. See Brandsma q.q. v. Hansa Chemie AG, HR, May 16, 1997, supra note 12.
52. See Struycken, supra note 3, at 353.
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agrees with the wisdom of limitations on assignment articulated by
any particular national law regime is beside the point. The fact is
that unrestrained freedom of contract inevitably undermines the
integrity of all national property law standards aimed at the
protection of third parties and enacted in the interests of national
public policy. 3 And this will be the result whether the particular
regime is objectively considered to be inimical or sympathetic to an
efficient and fair receivables financing regime.
There are those who defend unrestricted freedom of choice on
the theory that it is best calculated to produce a free market in legal
ideas, ultimately leading in practice to the choice of the "best"
secured financing regime, thereby producing practical uniformity of
result. This argument in effect amounts to a privatization of public
policy; it is left to the parties to each individual assignment, not the
law makers, to decide the optimal legal regime to govern the third
party effects of assignment. But what is the best choice of law from
the point of view of any particular assignee does not necessarily
coincide with what is best from the point of view of the public order
and of competing claimants. The likelihood of this discrepancy in
perception means that a party autonomy rule may fail to yield a
single governing law in a simple dispute involving competing
assignments, each governed by a different proper law, and each
valid and entitled to a first priority under that law (a plausible
scenario, as where, e.g., the law chosen by the parties to govern the
first assignment orders priority on the basis of first-in-time whereas
the law chosen by the parties to a subsequent assignment orders
priority on the basis of the order of registration of the assignments,
and the second assignment in time is the first to be registered).
Considerations of this kind long ago persuaded law makers to
settle on an objective connecting factor, the lex situs of the relevant
asset, to determine the law applicable to the property effects of
transactions involving tangible assets.54 The fact that receivables
and other intangible rights do not by definition have a physical
situs does not justify discarding the general principle of objectivity
which underpins the lex situs rule. It simply requires identification
of an acceptable functional alternative to physical situs.
53. Id. at 354-56.
54. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 3, at 511ff; Schilling, Some European
Decisions on Non-Possessory Security Rights in Private International Law, 34 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. (1985).
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Of the possible alternatives,55 two enjoy significant support at
the domestic law level. The first is the national lex situs of the debt,
the law of the place where the debtor is located. The second is the
law applicable to the assigned receivable-for contract-generated
receivables of the kind governed by the Convention, this is
effectively the proper law of the original contract between the
assignor and the debtor.56
The attractiveness of one or the other depends to some extent
on how the assigned obligation is conceptualized.57 If it is viewed as
a species of property right once "vested" in the assignee, then the
situs of the debtor is attractive as the closest functional equivalent
to the idea of practical control over the res (here the person of the
debtor) that underlies the lex situs rule for tangible property rights.
Conversely, if the assignment is conceptualized as merely a
substitution of the creditor to whom the assigned obligation is
owed, then it is reasonable to see the priority of the assignee's right
as governed by the same law that governs the assigned obligation.
Conceptual considerations aside (although their influence
should never be underestimated), the law governing the assigned
receivable is the more attractive choice of the two. Admittedly, the
applicable law is subject to manipulation by the insertion of a
standard form choice of law clause in all contracts entered into
between a prospective assignor and its various debtors.
Nonetheless, the law governing the assigned obligation offers a
more stable connecting factor than the debtor's location which is
vulnerable to change after an initial assignment. This makes it a
better choice to deal with issues of priority between competing
assignments. It also has the advantage of simplifying the choice of
law matrix since the same law also governs the assignee's rights
against the debtor (more on this later 5).
55. Before the principle of party autonomy (free choice) became the near-
universal rule for choice of law in contract, the law of the place where the contract
of assignment was executed was seen as a possible connecting factor. It suffers
from the same defect as the proper law of the contract of assignment in being
incapable of designating a single governing law in a competition between
successive assignments, each executed in a different state. Moreover, to quote
Wolff's withering dismissal of such a rule, to "test the assignment by the place
where it was made is to choose the least important of all points of contact, to
substitute fortuity for reason." WOLFF, supra note 3, at 542.
56. This is the approach endorsed in German law: see supra note 13.
57. See WOLFF, supra note 3, at 537-539.
58. See the text under the sub-heading "Choice of Law for Assignee-Debtor
Relations" infra.
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However, in modern financing practice, the assignment of
multiple and future receivables in a single transaction is common-
place, whether the assignment involves the outright sale of receiv-
ables as in a factoring or securitization arrangement, or their
assignment merely as collateral for a secured obligation. This
practical reality makes application of the law governing the
assigned debt a commercially inefficient solution. The assignee
would need to scrutinize each of the assigned contracts to
determine the applicable law and would then have to conform to
the priority rules of all relevant states. Priority would vary for
different receivables depending on their governing law, increasing
the costs of dispute resolution and insolvency administration. If the
assignment included future receivables owing by as-yet-unidentified
debtors, the assignee might not even be able to predict which laws
might potentially apply.
It is the practical demands of modern receivables financing
which ultimately led the Commission to endorse the law of the
assignor's location as the most appropriate choice of law rule for
priority. It is the only approach capable of supplying a single
predictable governing law for the global assignment of multiple
receivables owing by debtors in different states and for the assign-
ment of future receivables, thereby vastly reducing the inquiry and
monitoring burden on the assignee.
The superiority of the assignor location rule has been
recognized by analysts who have examined the issue with the
practical realities of modern global assignment practices in mind. 9
Some, however, have suggested a dualist approach. The law of the
assignor's location would apply to bulk assignments of existing and
future debts but the lex situs of the debt (effectively the lex situs of
the debtor) would apply to assignments of specific debts.' This
kind of qualification did not find its way into the Convention. A
dualist approach would have introduced an undesirable level of
59. See Moshinsky, supra note 3, at 611-13, 624; Struycken, supra note 3, at
357-60; Note, supra note 3. Struycken, supra note 3, at 357 n.50 cites Kieringer as
also favouring the same rule. See also Group of Experts Report Prepared by the
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
UNCITRAL A/CN.9/WG.II/WP90 (July 10, 1998) para 4.4.
60. See GOODE, supra note 3, at 1148. But Goode is somewhat ambiguous on
the whole question. In footnote 182 at 1128, he acknowledges that "in order to
have a uniform regime for debts generally, even the assignment of specific debts
could be subjected to the law of the assignor's place of business as regards their
proprietary effects." But then, at 1149-50, he appears to revert to an unqualified
rule in favour of the lex situs of the debtor for priorities, with no mention of any
exception for global assignments of receivables.
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complexity and uncertainty into the choice of law exercise: a
different law would potentially be applicable depending on whether
the assignment was structured as a global one or as a series of
specific assignments. This would have created the potential for
manipulation of the governing law. Moreover, such an approach
would fail to yield a single governing law in a contest between an
assignee of a specific receivable and an assignee taking under a
global assignment of all of the same assignor's receivables,
including the specific receivable which was the subject of the prior
assignment.
C. Defining the Location of the Assignor
Under the Convention, the assignor is presumed to be located
at its place of business or at his or her habitual residence in the rare
case of an assignor without a place of business.61 But what if the
assignor is an enterprise with multiple places of business or
branches in different states? In such a case, it is necessary to
designate one place of business as controlling. Otherwise, the
assignee's priority status would be governed by multiple and
potentially conflicting priority regimes, destroying the certainty and
predictability sought to be obtained by using a single stable
connecting factor for choice of law in the first instance.
Two choices are possible: the de facto centre of the assignor's
business, i.e. its chief executive office or centre of administration, or
its legal centre, i.e .the place under whose law it is constituted and
where its registered "head office" is located.
From the point of view of the assignee, a registered head office
or equivalent test provides greater certainty and predictability than
one predicated on a firm's administrative centre. The former is
easily ascertained by checking the public records of the state under
whose laws the entity was constituted. Locating the latter is a
subjective and fact-dependent exercise, which may give rise to
interpretative difficulties on particular facts.62  Moreover, a
61. UNCITRAL Convention article 5(h).
62. See Kevin White, 0' Give Me a Home: Determining the Location of the
Debtor's Chief Executive Office Under Section 9-103 of the UCC, 18 REV. LITIG.
207 (1999) (reviewing conflicting tests developed by different United States courts
to determine chief executive office for the purposes of the conflicts rules for
perfection in old U.C.C. Art 9: (1) centre of greatest volume of business; (2) centre
of main business management taking into account the reasonable expectations of
creditors; (3) executive headquarters.) The latter is the most appropriate test and
the one evidently intended by the use of the more explicit wording, "place where
[the assignor's] central administration is exercised " in article 6(i) of the
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company's administrative centre is more easily relocated and more
prone to relocation than its registered head office or place of
incorporation.
The Convention nonetheless adopts a de facto centre of
business test: an assignor with places of business in more than one
state is deemed to be located in the state where its central
administration is exercised.63 Once again, this policy choice is in
line with the views of analysts who have seriously considered the
issue.64 Priority is concerned with the impact of the assignment on
third parties, and from their perspective, a de facto centre of
business test is more appropriate. The law of that jurisdiction is
more likely to be in the reasonable contemplation of assignees and
creditors who enter into business dealings with the assignor.
Application of the assignor's law also eliminates any incentive for
assignors to incorporate in an insolvency haven to the potential
prejudice of less sophisticated creditors. The assignor's real centre
of administration is also the place where the principal insolvency
proceedings involving the assignor are most likely to be
commenced. This means that the law of the insolvency forum will
typically coincide with the substantive law applicable to priorities,
decreasing the costs of having to plead and prove a foreign law, and
eliminating the potential for conflict with the public policy of the
insolvency forum.
Finally, the assignor's location in a Contracting State is the
principal territorial triggering factor for application of the
Convention.65 To avoid confusion and enhance predictability, it is
desirable that the test for location be the same in both contexts, and
a centre of administration test is more satisfactory for territorial
UNCITRAL Convention.
63. UNCITRAL Convention article 5(h).
64. See Note, supra note 3; Moshinsky, supra note 3, at 611-613; Struycken,
supra note 3, at 358-60. Note that the general rules for locating an assignor under
revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States are
substantially similar to those found in article 5(h) of the Convention. Under
revised § 9-307(b), a debtor who is a natural person is deemed to be located at his
or her principal residence, while a legal person is deemed to be located at its place
of business, or at its chief executive office if it has a place of business in more than
one state. The Article 9 concept of chief executive office is essentially the same as
the central administration concept used in the Convention. See § 9-307 Official
Comment 2: "'Chief executive office' means the place from which the debtor
manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs." The Canadian
Personal Property Security Acts also adopt a chief executive test location rule for
debtors located in multiple jurisdictions: see e.g. Ontario PPSA section 7.
65. Article 1(1)(a).. And see supra text under the sub-heading "Scope of
Application of the Conflicts Rules of the Convention."
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scope purposes. Relative to a legal centre of business test, it
ensures a wider scope of application for the Convention since
jurisdictions which offer corporate charters for taxation or other
reasons of convenience are often not the states which are the first to
adopt international conventions.
D. Location of the Assignor in Federal States
In states organized on federal lines, law making jurisdiction
over assignment law may be, and typically is, vested in the
individual territorial units which comprise that state rather than at
the federal or national level. In such instances, it is not enough to
locate the assignor in the state as whole; it is necessary to link the
assignor in a territorial unit. The Convention accommodates this
need by a special interpretation rule, which essentially repeats the
general rules for location within a State proper. Thus, an assignor is
deemed to be located in the territorial unit within a State in which it
has its place of business, in the territorial unit where it has its
central administration is exercised if it has a place of business in
more than one territorial unit, and in the territorial unit of habitual
residence if the assignor has no place of business.66 However, states
are permitted to specify different intrastate location rules by
declaration under the Convention.67 This qualification is intended
to accommodate the needs of states, the notable example being the
United States under revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which, for reasons of administrative efficiency, use different
location criteria in the intra-state as opposed to international
conflicts context.68
66. UNCITRAL Convention article 36.
67. Id.
68. Under revised U.C.C. article 9, the general rules for location in article § 9-
307(b) are subject to an exception in the case of a "registered organization," i.e. an
entity organized under a United States federal or state law which requires a public
record to be maintained disclosing the organization, e.g. U.S. companies and U.S.
limited partnerships. Such U.S.-registered organizations are deemed to be located
in their state of organization within the United States in the case of entities
organized under U.S. state law, or in the state within the United States designated
by federal law or by the parties in the case of entities organized under U.S. federal
law. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(70)(76), 9-307 (e), (f). The ability to make a declaration
under article 36 of the Convention will enable the U.S. to preserve these special
internal location criteria in cases where the assignor is found to be located
somewhere within the United States under the location rules in article 5(h) of the
Convention.
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E. Location of Banks and Other Financial Institutions
During the preparation of the Convention, there was a certain
level of ongoing support for creating special location criteria in the
case of assignments made by a bank carrying on business in
different countries through a branch or agency structure, as
opposed to a separate corporate subsidiary. The aim of such
exceptions would have been to refer priority issues to the law of the
State where the branch or agency that had the closest connection to
the assigned receivable is located, as opposed to the law of the State
where the central administration of the bank is exercised.69 In the
end, no such exception appears in the Convention, and, on balance,
that was the appropriate result. Such an exception would have
generated far more difficulties than it would have resolved.7"
69. This is the approach apparently taken by revised U.C.C. article 9, which
adopts special location rules for a foreign bank that carries out operations in the
United States through a branch or agency structure, as opposed to an independent
corporate subsidiary. The branch or agency of the foreign bank is deemed to be
located in the state within the United States where it is licensed if all branches or
agencies are licensed only in that one state. See U.C.C. § 9-307(i). If the foreign
bank has branches or agencies in more that one state within the United States,
then the branch or agency is deemed to be located in the state within the United
States designated by federal law, or designated by the branch or agency itself if
federal law authorizes such designation; otherwise, it is deemed to be located in
the District of Columbia. See U.C.C. § 9-307(f). These special location rules apply
for the purposes of the general choice of law rule in § 9-301 under which the law of
the assignor's location governs issues relating to perfection and priority. They
effectively seek to treat the branch or agency as though it were an independent
assignor, a separate entity, so as to bring into play the application of U.S. law. To
be workable, the application of these special location rules must therefore be
conditioned implicitly on the assignment having been executed in the name or on
behalf of the U.S. branch or agency acting as though it were a separate entity. This
may raise difficult questions of proof of intent. And what if such an assignment
comes into competition with an assignment of the same receivable made by the
bank as whole, or through another department or agency located in a different
country? This is not an implausible scenario as where, e.g., the branch assigns
specific receivables arising through branch operations and the bank executes a
global assignment of all its receivables. Does U.S, law still govern simply because
one of the competing assignments happened to be made by or through a U.S.
branch or agency? If so, what happens if the litigation is heard in a different
jurisdiction, e.g. the jurisdiction where the competing assignee is located? The
foreign court is unlikely to defer to U.S. law simply because one of the assignments
happened to be made through a U.S. branch. Similarly, what happens if
insolvency proceedings involving the foreign bank are instituted in its home
jurisdiction? Without a developed international consensus on the treatment of
branches as separate legal entities, it is unlikely that a foreign insolvency tribunal
will be willing to defer to United States assignment law in view of the potential
detriment to creditors and competing assignees in other countries.
70. For a detailed critique of the problems of a branch office location rule for
determining the law applicable to an assignment of accounts, from which some of
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First, there is the very serious challenge of defining the concept
of a "bank" and a "branch." The problems are especially acute in
today's dynamic financial climate in which such traditional banking
activities as accepting deposits and making loans or extending
credit are being undertaken by entities far removed from the
traditional idea of a bank, and with technological advances rapidly
changing the traditional physical idea of the "branch" as well as the
accounting structure of branch operations.
Second, treating the in-country branch of a foreign financial
service provider as effectively a separate legal entity threatens the
certainty and stability of general legal doctrine concerning legal
personality. Admittedly, the local branch of a foreign bank is
generally subject to separate regulation and supervision under the
banking laws of most states to much the same extent as if it were
operating as a corporate subsidiary However, for the purposes of
private law, including debtor/creditor, property, obligations, man-
date or agency and insolvency law, branches are not typically
treated as having a distinct or independent legal personality.
Third, there are the public policy implications inherent in
excepting banks from the general rules applicable to other
businesses. It is true that banks are more apt to operate
internationally through a branch rather than subsidiary structure, in
part so as to be able to more easily satisfy minimum capital or asset
requirements imposed by regulators. However, this is not a static
state of affairs and other entities may find benefits in a branch or
agency structure.
Fourth, a branch office exception would generate uncertainties
and complexities in the event of the assignor's insolvency. The
effectiveness of assignments would have to be tested by reference
to the laws of the state in which each individual branch is located.
This would greatly increase the adjudicatory burden on the
insolvency court. Moreover, there is no necessary correlation in the
insolvency context between the location of the various branches
and the claims of the assignor's creditors. Since insolvency laws
typically extend national treatment to foreign and local creditors
alike, the benefits of subordination of the assignee's interest under
the laws of a state where a particular branch is located would not
necessarily inure to the benefit of those creditors most closely
connected to that branch. Although a rule to such effect might be
the points made in the text of the paper are taken. See Note, supra note 3, at 433-
37; see also supra note 69.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
fashioned, there is no easy or obvious way to carry out the
accounting.
Fifth, a branch office exception would also increase the burden
on prospective assignees. An assignee of receivables owing to
branches located in a multiplicity of states would have to conform
to the priority rules of all of them, including conformity with any
filing requirements imposed by those laws.
Finally, what about creditors whose principal dealings with the
assignor are at the assignor's head office or through a different
branch than the one to which the receivables relate? On what
theory should their priority rights against the assignee be deter-
mined by reference to the law of the jurisdiction where the branch
office to which the receivable relates is located? And why should
creditors be required to investigate the records, if any, of all states
in which branch offices are located in order to gain an overall
picture of the assignor's financial health?
F. Public Policy and Mandatory Law Limits on the Application of
the Law of the Assignor's Location
Will States hesitate to endorse the Convention out of concern
that deference to the law of the assignor's location to determine the
priority of the assignee's interest may interfere with their own
fundamental third party protection and insolvency policies? Under
the centre of administration location rule, the litigation forum will
very often coincide with the state where the assignor is located.
This means that the forum's own domestic law will be the law
applicable to priority under the Convention choice of law rule in
any event. So a conflict between domestic priority policy, and the
priority policy of the law designated as applicable under the
Convention can arise only if the litigation takes place in a State
other than the State where the assignor is located, e.g. the state
where the debtor or assignee is located.
The whole point of the Convention choice of law rule is, of
course, to ensure certainty and predictability in the determination
of the law applicable to the priority of an assignee's interest against
competing claimants. If extensive exceptions were permitted, that
objective would be lost. So the Convention recognizes only two
highly qualified limitations.
First, a court may refuse to apply a provision of the law of the
State in which the assignor is located only if that provision is
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manifestly contrary to the public policy of the forum State.71 This is
a commonplace qualification in international law conventions, and
its sphere of operation is now everywhere understood to be very
attenuated.72 The law otherwise applicable will be excluded only if
its application would offend some widely-shared moral or ethical
standard, not merely the singular policy of the particular forum.
Public policy in this sense operates primarily as an exclusionary
rule: it permits rejection of the relevant provision of foreign law
without thereby necessarily substituting the positive application of
an equivalent provision of domestic law. The latter is the -function
of so-called "super-mandatory rules:" rules which may not be
excluded by contract and which reflect a sufficiently strong social or
economic policy concern of national law to justify their application
so as to override the otherwise applicable law even in cases with an
international complexion, provided that the policy objectives of the
rule are engaged in the facts before the court.73
The Convention does not generally preserve the super-
mandatory rules of the forum or of any other interested state. On
the contrary, it expressly prohibits the displacement of the law of
the assignor's state by reference to the mandatory rules of either
the forum or any third state. 74 This unprecedented approach was
considered necessary to avoid the risk of completely undermining
the Convention's general choice of law rule. Unlike the public
policy exclusion, mandatory rules may reflect no more than the
singular, albeit strongly-held, policy objectives of the particular
jurisdiction in which they are found. As such, they could, in theory,
include rules requiring registration or notification of the debtor as a
pre-condition to priority, predicated as such rules are on public
policy considerations having to do with the protection of local third
parties.
To avoid forum priority policy overriding the priority policy of
the assignor's location, the Convention contains only a very limited
saving clause for a very limited category of forum priority rules"5 :
preferential rights to priority that arise by operation of law76 of the
71. UNCITRAL Convention article 23.1.
72. See generally Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on
the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 319 (1996).
73. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 3, at 1111-13; see also Voser, supra note 72.
74. UNCITRAL Convention article 23.2.
75. UNCITRAL Convention article 23.3.
76. Although only non-consensual preferential rights are preserved, note that
the claim of a creditor which is "secured" by a preferential right may itself have
arisen out of a consensual relationship, e.g. statutory preferential rights in favour
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forum state, and which would have priority over the rights of an
assignee in insolvency proceedings under the law of the forum state.
This exception is stated in permissive terms ("may") to signal that
the courts should take a restrained approach, preserving local
preferential rights to priority only if their underlying policy
rationale is clearly engaged.
Despite its highly qualified scope, this exception still creates
some uncertainty for prospective assignees. They must still invest-
igate other potentially connected laws, particularly the law of the
debtor's location, to determine to what extent their priority under
the law of the assignor's location may be undermined by super-
priority rights afforded by operation of law under that other law in
favour of competing claimants, e.g., the state or employees of the
assignor.
A provision which appeared in earlier versions of the
Convention, (and which was retained in the UNIDROIT
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment) would
have offered a more satisfactory compromise between preserving
the rights of preferential creditors under domestic law and the
certainty needs of financiers. Under that provision, contracting
states would have been required to specifically identify by
declaration the categories of preferential rights arising under
domestic law that are to have priority over the assignee's interest in
proceedings occurring in that state. However, a number of States
objected, apparently on the basis that it would be "too difficult" to
identify the complex of such interests within their domestic systems,
a basis of objection scarcely calculated to alleviate the concerns of
financers. So while the Convention permits such a declaration to be
deposited on a purely voluntary basis,77 preferential rights are still
preserved in the absence of a declaration. It is to be hoped that
most States take advantage of the opportunity (and that interested
commercial organizations encourage them to do so).
G. Effect of Absence of a Public Registration Regime Under the
Applicable Law
For states that require public filing as a pre-condition to the
third party effectiveness of an assignment, the prospect of having to
refer priority to a governing law which does not have an equivalent
public disclosure rule may well create concern. Consider, for
of employees.
77. UNCITRAL Convention article 23.3 (final sentence).
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example, a Ruritanian company which operates branch establish-
ments throughout Canada and the United States where public
registration is generally required to perfect the assignee's interest
against competing claimants and operates as the usual means of
ordering priority. Assume Ruritanian law instead orders priority
on the basis of a simple nemo dat quod non habet principle, under
which an assignment once executed takes effect against subsequent
third parties. If Ruritanian law applies at the choice of law level, a
prospective assignee or creditor who deals with the company
through any of its North American branches will have no
objectively reliable means of ascertaining whether the receivables
already have been assigned.
The conflicts regimes in some of the Canadian Personal
Property Security Acts and in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code in the United States seek to protect local creditors and
assignees in this situation by way of an explicit exception to the
general application of the law of the assignor's location to issues of
perfection and priority. Under the relevant provision in the
Canadian Acts, an assignee's interest is subordinate to an interest
acquired in any receivable payable within the province if the
assignor's law does not provide for public filing or similar public
notification of an assignment. To avoid subordination, the assignee
must file locally before the competing interest arises."8
A similar policy informs revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States. A foreign business assignor
whose home law does not require public registration is deemed to
be located in the District of Columbia so as to require filing of a
notice of the assignment in the DC registry as a condition of
asserting rights in the assigned receivables against competing
claimants.79
In contrast, the priority regimes in Canada's largest and most
populous provinces, Ontario and Quebec, refer priority in accounts
to the law of the assignor's location without regard to the presence
or absence of a public filing system under that law.' The legal and
business communities in these provinces apparently have not
lobbied for the introduction of the exceptions found in the other
provincial laws and in Article 9. This may reflect the perception
78. See, e.g., New Brunswick PPSA sections 7(3)-(4).
79. U.C.C. § 9-307(c). The revised rule replaces old UCC § 9-103(3) under
which the law of the state in which the foreign assignor had its "major executive
office" within the United States governed perfection where the assignor was
located in a jurisdiction which did not provide for perfection by public filing.
80. See Civil Code of Quebec article 3108 and Ontario PPSA section 7(2).
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that such exceptions serve only to increase transaction costs without
bringing about any complementary increase in certainty and
predictability. Transaction costs are increased because prospective
assignees must investigate the law in place in the assignor's location
and reach qualitative judgments on the existence and adequacy of
any filing regime provided by that law in order to know whether
they should also file under Article 9 or the PPSA, as the case may
be. Moreover, any such filing does not relieve a prospective
assignee from the need to also comply with the priority require-
ments of the law of the assignor's location. This is because, as a
practical matter, priority disputes are most likely to be litigated in
the state where the assignor is located, and the courts in that state
will apply their own priority rules, not those of Article 9 or the
PPSAs, to resolve that dispute. In other words, such exceptions
may actually operate to decrease certainty and predictability by
bringing into play two different and conflicting priority regimes,
depending on the forum in which any future priority dispute is
eventually litigated.
At the level of principle, exceptions of this kind constitute an
attempt to superimpose domestic priority standards on assign-
ments emanating from a foreign assignor and otherwise considered
to be most appropriately governed by the law of the assignor's
location. As noted above, the Convention generally prohibits the
displacement of the priority rules of the assignor's state by
reference to the super-mandatory priority rules of forum law.8" It
follows that States wishing to adopt the Convention must be
prepared to abandon attempts to export their own national priority
policy to the international private law sphere.
In fact, no proposal was ever made in the course of preparation
of the Convention to incorporate any exception to the general
choice of law rule where the assignor's location lacked a public
filing regime. Politically, this was wise. If international consensus
could not be achieved on a registration-based priority rule at the
substantive level, why would states lacking such a system have been
prepared to agree to a registration-biassed exception at the choice
of law level? Politics aside, such an exception would have
detracted, for the reasons given above, from the general mission of
the Convention to ensure application of a single predictable
governing law for priority.
81. See supra note 74.
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H. Choice of Law for Priority in the Proceeds of the Assigned
Receivable
The Convention confirms, as a matter of uniform substantive
law, that an assignee's right in the assigned receivable carries with it
a legal right to the proceeds of its collection, regardless of whether
the proceeds are paid directly to the assignee, to the assignor, or to
a third party over whom the assignee has priority.82 However, the
substantive right to proceeds recognized by the Convention
operates only "as between the assignor and assignee."83 The priority
of the assignee's right to retain or claim proceeds against competing
claimants is dealt with only in a very limited fashion, and then only
at the choice of law level.
The law of the assignor's location determines the priority of
the assignee's entitlement to any proceeds of the assigned receiv-
able in two instances. The first is where the proceeds are already in
the assignee's hands when the priority dispute arises.8' The second
is where the proceeds are received by the assignor under
instructions from the assignee to hold the proceeds for the benefit
of the assignee separately, and are in fact sufficiently segregated
from the assignor's other assets so as to be reasonably identifiable.85
However, this second exception is qualified. The law of the
assignor's location does not necessarily apply to the priority of any
person who has a right of set-off against the proceeds or whose
right in the proceeds is created by agreement and is not derived
from a right in the receivable.' 6 This latter reference clearly covers,
and is meant minimally to cover, a claim to cash proceeds which
have been deposited into a deposit account held by the assignor
with, and asserted by, a bank or securities intermediary pursuant to
an agreement entered into with the assignor. But the caveat is cast
in general terms and is potentially much broader. It covers any
competition between a receivables assignee and a claimant who
82. UNCITRAL Convention article 14.
83. This is made clear in the chapeau to article 14. Note that the assignee's
right to proceeds as against the assignor is subject to any contrary agreement
between the parties, and, under article 14.3, is limited to the value of the assignee's
right in the assigned receivable. This latter caveat covers cases where the
receivables are assigned by way of security only, with the result that the assignee's
may retain collected proceeds only to the extent necessary to discharge the secured
obligation.
84. UNCITRAL Convention article 24.1.
85. UNCITRAL Convention article 24.2.
86. UNCITRAL Convention article 24.3.
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asserts a right to the proceeds as a result of an agreement which
directly covers the relevant proceeds as opposed to claiming them
as a result of an assignment of the receivable which generated the
proceeds.
These two exceptions aside, the priority of an assignee's claim
to proceeds will be governed by the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law of the particular forum. In other
words, the Convention choice of law rule for priority in the assigned
receivable does not apply to priority in the proceeds of collection of
the receivable. This is a necessary gap. Proceeds may take any
form and it would have been inappropriate and practically
impossible to establish a uniform choice of law regime for all
conceivable categories of tangible and intangible movables in a
convention devoted to the specific topic of receivables.
IV. Choice of Law for the Contractual Aspects of Assignor and
Assignee Relations
A. Introduction
At the substantive level, all legal systems accept that the
reciprocal rights and obligations of the assignor and assignee are
governed by their contract." This philosophy is replicated in the
substantive rules of the Convention on the terms, condition,
representations and warranties of the assignor and assignee
relationship. These are uniformly stated as suppletive or default
rules, applicable only in the absence of contrary agreement.8
Not surprisingly, the same philosophy is carried over to the
choice of law regime in article 28 of Chapter V of the Convention.
In line with the prevailing approach for choice of law in contract
generally, 9 the assignor and assignee are left free to choose the law
87. See Kotz, supra note 37, at 82.
88. See Chapter IV, Section I (articles 11-14).
89. See, e.g., article 3(1) of the Rome Convention. A few legal systems still
require that the transaction bear at least a minimal reasonable connection to the
chosen law. Most notably, the rule of party autonomy in the United States is
subject to the proviso that the law chosen by the parties bear some reasonable
relation to the transaction. See, e.g., UCC § 1-105(1) (1994) which permits the
parties to stipulate the law which will govern their transaction if the stipulated law
"bears a reasonable relation" to the transaction. The official comment explains
that ordinarily the parties must choose a jurisdiction "where a significant enough
portion of the making or performance of the contract" will occur. However, the
proviso is construed liberally and the American Law Institute is currently
considering adoption of a broader rule of party autonomy for choice of law matters
governed by UCC § 1-105(1). See Ryan E. Bull, Operation of the New Article 9
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governing the mutual rights and obligations arising from the
agreement between them.9' In the absence of a choice, the
applicable law is that of the State with which the contract of
assignment is most closely connected.9 This again reflects widely-
shared views on the appropriate default formula.92.
The parties' freedom of choice is subject to one caveat. The
Convention preserves the discretionary application of the super-
mandatory rules of the forum state and of a closely-connected third
country.93 The preservation of super mandatory rules is unlikely to
have much practical impact. In the vast majority of legal systems,
the parties to a contract of assignment are left free to stipulate their
mutual rights and duties.94 Moreover, it is widely agreed that in
international contracts, the exercise of judicial discretion to over-
ride the parties' choice of law should be confined to those rules
which are of such fundamental importance to the social or
Choice of Law Regime in an International Context, 78 TEx. L. REv. 679, 692 (2000)
(references cited in n.46).
90. See Article 28.1. Note that Article 28.1 refers simply to the "law chosen by
the parties." There is no explicit requirement for an express choice. In
determining whether a choice of law can be implied, the forum court presumably
can apply its own supplementary private international law principles. Under, e.g.,
article 3(1) of the Rome Convention, the parties' choice may be implied if their
intention is demonstrated with reasonable certainty from the terms of the contract
or the circumstances of the case. It only if an examination of the parties' intention
does no reveal an implied choice that one then applies the closest connection
formula in article 4(1). It is a matter of debate whether there is any practical
difference in result between an implied choice and closest connection formula.
See, e.g., PETER GABRIEL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SYNDICATED LOANS 21-27 (London:
Butterworths, 1986). Courts frequently have used the tests of implied intention
and closest connection interchangeably, and in a manner which takes account of
the parties's interests. Thus, the fact that the contract uses language and terms
which are appropriate for one system but not another, or contains a choice of
forum or currency of payment obligation in favour of one country as opposed to
another, has been regarded in some cases as a weighty indicator of both implied
intention and closest connection. See, e.g., Imperial Life Assurance Co. of Canada
v. Colmenares [1967] SCR 443; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance
Co. [1984] AC 50 (HL).
91. See article 28.2.
92. See, e.g., article 4(1) of the Rome Convention. The Rome Convention, in
article 4(2), presumes that a contract is most closely connected with the country
where the party who is to effect the performance is located. The test of
characteristic performance means the performance that is most characteristic of
the particular type of contract, e.g. for a contract of sale, the delivery of goods, for
a contract of services, the performance of those services. Applied to the
assignment context, application of the characteristic performance test in the Rome
Convention would yield, at least in simple cases, a presumption in favour of the
law of the assignor's location as the most closely connected law. See also
Sturycken, supra note 3, at 359.
93. UNCITRAL Convention article 31.
94. See Kotz, supra note 37, at 82.
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economic goals of the relevant state as to require their application
even in cases where the contract also implicates the interests of
other states by virtue of its international connectivity.95 Even then,
the forum rule should be invoked only if the issue falls within the
spatial scope of the rule, as determined from the territorial linkages
expressly spelled out in the rule, or, in the more typical case where
the legislation is silent, from an analysis of its underlying policy.
A similar cautionary approach must be taken to the operation
of the public policy exception recognized by the Convention.96 In
contrast to super-mandatory rules, which are rules of positive
application overriding the proper law of the contract, the public
policy exception is concerned with the circumstances when the
court can invoke forum public policy as a negative rule of rejection
to exclude the application of a foreign law which would otherwise
be applicable. Under the Convention, the court can do this only if
the foreign provision is "manifestly contrary" to forum public
policy. This terminology is widely used in international conventions
and is designed to signal to the courts that they should exercise
extreme caution before invoking subjective domestic concepts of
public policy to deny effect to contractual provisions contained in
an international contract which are valid and enforceable under the
law governing that contract.
V. Choice of Law for the Proprietary Aspects of Assignments
Under article 29, the sphere of the proper law of the contract
of assignment is clearly confined to the purely contractual or
personal aspects of the assignor/assignee relationship, e.g. the
interpretation of its terms and conditions including implications as
to party intent, the assignee's obligation to pay the price or to
render the promised credit as the case may be, the existence and
effect of any representations and warranties as to the validity and
enforceability of the assigned debt, and as to the assignee's recourse
against the assignor in the event of breach. But what law governs
the assignment itself, i.e., the actual transfer of title, or the creation
of security rights, in the assigned receivables as opposed to the
contractual arrangements surrounding that transfer?
Considerations of comparative law support referring issues
relating to the proprietary aspects of assignments to the law
governing priority.97 This is because, while some legal systems draw
95. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 3, at 1111-13; see also Voser, supra note 72.
96. UNCITRAL Convention article 32.
97. See the persuasive analysis by Struycken, supra note 3, at 357-360.
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a clear distinction between the inter partes and third party effective-
ness of assignments, and their relative priority ranking, in others,
the only question is whether the assignor has done whatever is
required to vest title to the assigned receivable in the particular
assignee. If so, the assignment takes effect simultaneously against
the debtor and third parties, including subsequent assignees and the
assignor's insolvency administrator. This diversity of conceptual
approaches makes it difficult, in devising a workable choice of law
formula, to sever the law to govern issues relating to the proprietary
effectiveness of the assignment from the law to govern issues
relating to its third party effects.
The Convention seeks to straddle the murky property/priority
dividing line through an expansive definition of the scope of the
"priority" issues governed by the law of the assignor's location.
Read in isolation, the definition is broad enough to capture the
property transfer rules of the applicable law on the theory that the
satisfaction of any requirements necessary to render an assignment
effective as between the parties are necessarily also preconditions
to the effectiveness of the assignment against third parties.98 In
other words, where issues of proprietary effectiveness arise in the
context of a priority dispute with a competing claimant, the
Convention can be read as endorsing the view that property and
priority issues should be subject to the same governing law; the law
of the assignor's location.
However, for assignments within the territorial scope of the
Convention, the choice of law rule for priority in article 22 (and the
associated definition of priority in article 5(g)) has to be read in
conjunction with the substantive rule in article 8 dealing with the
effectiveness of assignments.' Article 8 stipulates that an assign-
ment is not ineffective and may not be denied priority even against
third parties solely on the ground that it involves multiple
receivables or future receivables.
This attempt to combine a substantive rule for the
effectiveness of assignments and a choice of law rule for priority
98. Article 5(g) defines "priority" for the purposes of the choice of law rule in
article 22 (and the parallel rule in article 30 of Chapter V) as follows: "'Priority'
means the right of a person in preference to the right of another person and, to the
extent relevant for such purpose, includes the determination whether the right is a
personal right or a property right, whether or not it is a security right for
indebtedness or other obligation and whether any requirements necessary to
render the right effective against a competing claimant have been satisfied."
99. The opening words of article 22 indicate that the law of the assignor's
location governs priority "with the exception of matters that are settled elsewhere
in the Convention..."
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may give rise to difficult interpretive questions depending on the
content of the legal regime in place in the particular assignor's
location. Consider, for instance, the provisions of the 1992 Dutch
Civil Code under which an assignment by way of security takes
effect only upon notification of the debtor or upon execution (and
registration in a private registry to prevent fraudulent antedating)
of a notarial deed specifically listing the assigned receivables one by
one.' °° By virtue of these requirements, it is clear that an assign-
ment of the kind sought to be validated by article 8 of the
Convention-an assignment of all present and future debts owing
to the assignor-would be treated as invalid and ineffective as a
matter of Dutch law. But what if the Netherlands were to adopt the
Convention? Article 8 stipulates that an assignment cannot be
declared ineffective even against third parties merely because it
involves unspecified future or multiple receivables. It is arguable
that article 8 would therefore operate to render such an assignment
effective, even against competing claimants, and even though,
assuming the assignor were Dutch, the law of the Netherlands
would be the law otherwise applicable to priority under article 22 of
the Convention. While this result might seem welcome in view of
the criticism that has been levelled against the restrictive Dutch
regime, it does little to advance certainty and predictability. After
all, if Dutch law does not contemplate such an assignment ever
being effective in the first instance, how can the parties predict how
its priority status will be resolved?1 '
The preceding analysis suggests that if confusion is to be
avoided, states that elect to implement the Convention may need to
adjust their domestic rules on the effectiveness of assignments of
bulk and future receivables in a manner compatible with the liberal
Convention rules. It would still be open to these states to limit the
third party effects of such assignments if this is considered desirable
for public policy reasons, e.g., in order to preserve a cushion of
assets in the form of future receivables to feed the claims of the
assignor's execution creditors or insolvency trustee. However, to
enable the smooth coordinated application of articles 8 and 22, this
100. See Struycken, supra note 3, at 352.
101. As noted earlier, in Brandsma q.q. v. Hansa Chemie AG, May 16 1997,
supra note 12, the Hoge Radd validated such an assignment of future receivables,
relying on an implied choice of German law in the Dutch assignor's contract of
assignment. However, the contest there was between the assignee and the
assignor's Dutch liquidator meaning that simple property theories were adequate
to resolve the priority issue. But if the dispute involved competing assignments,
the courts would have to manufacture a more sophisticated theory of priorities.
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will likely need to be done via an explicit priority or third party
opposability rule fashioned in a manner that does not bring about
an a priori invalidation of an assignment of future receivables. In
other words, States unfamiliar with the concept may nonetheless
need to introduce the idea of the relativity of title into their
assignment laws in order to accommodate future receivables
financing as contemplated by article 8 while still preserving their
own national substantive priority policies as contemplated by article
22.
In the context of current Dutch law, a rule which authorized
the effective assignment of future receivables, but then ordered
priority against competing claimants on the basis of the time of
notification of the debtor or execution of a deed identifying the
particular receivable, would probably work. Although such a
regime would continue to impair full-fledged future receivables
financing, it would not run directly afoul of article 8 since it would
not operate to invalidate such assignments in the first instance. In
other words, while article 8 will likely have the effect of bringing
about a liberalization of the domestic rules of Contracting States so
as to permit bulk and future receivables financing, the ultimate
effectiveness of such assignments against third parties, including
insolvency administrators, will still be dependent on the national
priority policies of the assignor's home State.
VI. Choice of Law for Formal Validity of Contracts of Assignment
The preceding discussion sheds some light on the issue of the
choice of law to govern the formal validity of a contract of
assignment. Because the contract of assignment is usually the
vehicle by which the assignment itself is effected, legal systems
often prescribe special formality requirements, especially where the
assignment operates by way of security. In some cases, compliance
with the relevant formality is a precondition even to the inter partes
effectiveness of the assignment." In other legal systems,
102. This is the rule of U.C.C. article 9 under which the contract effecting or
evidencing the assignment must be reduced to a writing signed by the assignor and
containing a description of the assigned receivables for the assignment itself to
become effective. See revised U.C.C. article 9§-203(b)(3)(A). It is also the
approach taken by the Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ) in the case of hypothecary
assignments, that is to say, an assignment of receivables by way of security. Article
2696 of the CCQ requires a security assignment to be granted in writing and signed
by the parties, on pain of absolute nullity. Moreover, the writing must contain a
description of the receivables and indicate the maximum $ sum secured by the
security right.
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compliance with the relevant contract formality is necessary only
for the purposes of third party effectiveness of the assignment.10 3
These differences indicate that formal requirements may be
intended to perform multiple functions, relevant to both the inter
partes and third party contexts, depending on the particular legal
regime and its policy concerns. As between the parties, a formality
rule may be designed to protect the assignor by bringing home the
seriousness of the undertaking. Or it may be aimed at minimizing
future disputes between the parties as to the scope of the
receivables covered by the assignment.
As regards third parties, especially third party creditors, a
writing requirement or other contract formality, e.g., a notarial
instrument, may be intended to operate as a prophylactic against
the heightened risk of fraudulent collusion which exists with oral
assignments, either in the form of a collusive antedating of the
assignment, or collusion as to the true scope of the receivables
assigned. In systems in which priority is ordered according to a
simple first in time rule, formality rules may also function to
establish a "certain date" for the ranking of competing assignments,
thereby avoiding a waste of judicial resources on resolving difficult
evidentiary issues. Other formality rules, e.g., a requirement to
specify the value or maximum value of the secured obligation in the
context of a security assignment, may be aimed at limiting the value
of the assignee's priority as regards competing claimants, thereby
also limiting that assignees's monopolistic position in the provision
of credit to the debtor. '°4 The same is true in respect of formalities
rules that require specification of the assigned debts in a written
document to the extent that such rules are intended to ensure that a
certain level of future receivables will remain free to satisfy
unsecured creditor claims.
Because the purpose of formality rules thus includes the
protection of third parties in the position of competing creditors, it
follows that such rules may also partake of the character of priority
rules. As such, they should logically be referred to the law
applicable to priority.
103. For instance, the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts require the
contract of assignment to be signed by the debtor and to describe the assigned
receivables only in order for the assignee's property interest in the receivables to
take effect as against third parties. As between the parties, an assignment can be
effected via a purely oral agreement. See, e.g., British Columbia PPSA §§ 10,
12(1)(c).
104. This is the approach taken in the Civil Code of Quebec, supra note 102.
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How does the Convention accommodate the diverse nature of
formality rules, and their diverse purposes? Article 27 of Chapter
V adopts a relatively flexible and facilitative choice of law rule in
line with the approach taken generally to contact formalities in the
Rome Convention. If the contract is concluded between parties
located in the same State, it is formally valid if it meets the form
requirements of its proper law or of the law of the state in which it
is concluded. If the parties are resident in different states, the
contract is formally valid as long as it conforms either to its proper
law or to the law of either of the States in which the parties are
located.
However, article 27 is explicitly confined to issues of formal
validity where they arise as between the parties. It follows that
even if the contract is formally valid under one or another of the
laws designated as applicable, the assignment itself may still be
ruled invalid for failure to comply with the formality rules of the
law of the assignor's location to the extent these requirements are
interpreted as [also] relating to priority.
VII. Law Applicable to the Characterization of "Assignments" as
Sale or Security
The term "assignment" is not uniformly understood. In some
legal systems, it designates an outright sale of the relevant receiv-
ables, as distinct from their hypothecation as collateral for secured
debt. In others, it encompasses all transactions intended to vest
real rights in receivables in another, whether by way of ownership
or merely security. In still others, it refers merely to the form of the
transaction, not its substantive character.
The Convention uses the term assignment to cover both the
transfer of and the creation of rights in receivables as security."' It
follows that the Convention conflicts regime applies to both types
of transaction. This is appropriate. There is no rational reason to
have a different choice of law rule for each. Indeed, such a
distinction would make the conflicts regime unworkable from the
point of view of both the debtor and competing claimants. They
would be forced to investigate and seek legal advice on the
substantive nature of the assignment in order to know what law
governed their rights vis d vis the assignee. Moreover, priority
between competing assignments, one by sale and the other by
105. See UNCITRAL Convention article 2(a).
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security, would end up being governed by different laws, leading to
an impasse.
This is not to say that the nature of the transaction is irrelevant
in applying the choice of law rules of the Convention. The
distinction between sale and security determines the extent of the
assignee's interest in the assigned receivable against the assignor.
An assignor who has sold its receivables outright has no further
claim to them, whereas one who has assigned them merely as
security, is entitled to any value left once the underlying secured
debt has been paid. This indirectly affects priority, insofar as
characterization determines the quantum of the priority right
enjoyed by the assignee under the applicable national law against
competing claimants. It is for this reason that the Convention
defines the scope of the "priority" issues governed by the law of the
assignor's location to include the determination of whether or not
the assignment is a security right for a debt or other obligation.1 6
VIII. Choice of Law for Assignee and Debtor Relations
A. Introduction
Chapter V of the Convention also deals with the appropriate
law to govern relations between the assignee and debtor.1 7 Even if
the assigned receivable can be conceived as property in the hands
of the assignor as against the assignee, the contractual relationship
between the assignor and debtor continues to exist after the
assignment. This requires a choice of law solution which protects
the debtor against undue prejudice to his or her original contractual
rights and obligations, without unduly impeding the assignee's
expectations of payment, thereby undermining the ability of
creditors to secure optimal value for their receivables.
Historically, there was considerable debate among conflicts
analysts as to the most appropriate connecting factor to satisfy
these competing tensions.10 Opinion was divided between the law
of the domicile of the original creditor on the debt (that is, the
assignor) and the law of the domicile of the debtor. Neither
alternative seems quite satisfactory since each ends up favouring
exclusively one or the other of the parties to the original contract.
To give a greater appearance of objectivity to the choice of the
106. UNCITRAL Convention article 5(g).
107. See UNCITRAL Convention article 29.
108. See, e.g., Batiffol, supra note 3.
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debtor's domicile, it is sometimes argued that it reflects the notional
lex situs of the debt since this is the place where any action to
enforce the debt will often have to be taken as a practical matter. °9
On the other hand, one might just as logically argue that the
notional lex situs of the debt is the original creditor/assignor's
location. After all, many legal systems, in the absence of an express
term, regard the place of payment as being the creditor's location
on the theory that a debtor is impliedly obligated to seek out the
creditor.
Today, application of the law governing the assigned obligation
is generally thought to be the approach that best reflects the
interests of the concerned parties. This is the rule endorsed by
article 29 of Chapter V of the Convention, following the general
lead of article 12(2) of the Rome Convention. However, whereas
the Rome Convention refers to "the law governing the receivable
to which the assignment relates," article 29 of the UNCITRAL
Convention more precisely speaks of the law governing the original
contract between the assignor and the debtor. Greater linguistic
precision is possible because, unlike the Rome Convention, the
UNCITRAL Convention applies only to contract-generated
receivables. °
Application of the proper law of the original contract is fair to
the debtor because it ensures that the debtor's original rights and
obligations can be changed by the assignment only to the extent
permitted by the law under which the debtor undertook those rights
and obligations. And it does not unduly undermine the assignor's
ability to market the debt to prospective assignees since, from the
latter's perspective, the law governing the original contract is
foreseeable at least in the context of an assignment of presently
owed or specifically identified receivables. As for bulk assignments
and assignments of future receivables owing by future unknown
debtors, predictability can be enhanced by virtue of an arrangement
between the assignor and assignee requiring the assignor to include
a choice of law clause in its contracts with its debtors and to warrant
the governing law in respect of all such contracts.
109. See, e.g., Moshinsky, supra note 3.
110. UNCITRAL Convention article 2(a).
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B. Relationship Between Article 29 and the Territorial Scope Rules
of the Convention
Article 29 is fairly explicit as to the issues falling within the
scope of the law governing the original contract: the effectiveness of
contractual limitations on assignment as between the assignee and
debtor, the relationship between the assignee and the debtor, the
conditions under which the assignment can be invoked against the
debtor, and any question relating to whether the debtor's
obligations have been discharged.1" Most of these issues are the
subject of a uniform substantive rule in the preceding articles of the
Convention.1 2 If follows that the role of article 29 is quite limited
as a supplementary gap filling technique for assignments which fall
within the overall scope of the Convention.
However, it will be recalled that even if the assignor is located
in a Contracting State, the substantive provisions of the Convention
as they relate to the debtor are triggered only if the debtor is also
located in a Contracting State or the law governing the original
contract is the law of a Contracting State."3 This latter connecting
factor may enable an assignee who wishes to ensure that the
substantive rules of the Convention apply to a debtor who is not
located in a Contracting State to indirectly achieve that result by
requiring the assignor to include an express choice of law clause in
the original contract in favour of the law of a Contracting State.
This technique may not, however, be completely reliable if the
litigation is heard in the debtor's home jurisdiction. The courts of a
non-contracting State are not of course bound by the Convention
and may not be prepared to interpret the contractual reference in
the original contract to the law of a Contracting State as a reference
to that State's Convention rules as opposed to its purely domestic
rules. Even if this interpretive hurdle is surmounted, forum public
policy and forum super-mandatory rules may be invoked to reject
application of the substantive rules of the Convention rules as they
relate to such controversial issues as nullification of the effects of an
anti-assignment clause as between the assignee and debtor.
111. UNCITRAL Convention article 29.
112. See generally UNCITRAL Convention Chapter IV, Section II, comprising
articles 15-21.
113. UNCITRAL Convention article 1.3. And see text infra under the sub-
heading "Scope of Application of the Conflicts Rules of the Convention."
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C. Preservation of Overriding Consumer Protection Norms of the
Debtor's Home State
The substantive provisions of the Convention as they relate to
the debtor are subject to the express preservation of any applicable
consumer protection norms. The Convention contains an omnibus
provision preserving the effectiveness of consumer protection laws
governing the protection of a debtor under consumer protection
laws, i.e., laws governing the protection of the parties to
transactions made for personal, family or household purposes."'
So, for instance, notwithstanding that the Convention validates the
effect-iveness of a waiver by the debtor of defences or set-off rights
available under the original contract,"5 this will be subject to any
applicable consumer protection laws nullifying the effects of such a
waiver.
The law governing the original contract presumably governs
the question of whether or not a particular consumer protection
norm applies so as to override the substantive provisions of the
Convention. Does this mean that consumer protection norms
enacted by the state in which the debtor is located can be evaded by
inserting a choice of law clause in the original contract in favour of
a less protective legal regime? To allow this would nullify the
policy underpinning the explicit preservation of consumer
protection laws. Two theories can, and likely will be, invoked to
avoid that result. First, in light of the general principle of consumer
protection articulated in the Convention, the forum court may well
interpret the reference to the "law governing the original contract"
as requiring an objective reference, in the case of a contract
involving a consumer debtor, to the most-closely connected law, as
opposed to giving full effect to party autonomy.' 6 Alternatively,
even if the choice of law clause is given presumptive effect, the
court may still appeal to those provisions of Chapter V which
preserve the super-mandatory norms of the forum or a closely
connected third state to override the otherwise applicable law."7
114. UNCITRAL Convention article 4.4.
115. UNCITRAL Convention article 19.
116. See the interpretation principles in article 7.2.
117. UNCITRAL Convention article 31.
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D. Law Applicable to Debtor's Set-off Rights
Does the law governing the original contract also determine
the availability to the debtor of set-off rights and defences as
against the assignee? The question is important because, on the
matter of set-off, the substantive provisions of the Convention do
not supply an exhaustive code. It follows that the choice of
applicable national law may be relevant even in respect of
assignments within the direct scope of the Convention.
In exploring this question, it is useful to distinguish between
what is sometimes called transaction set-off and independent set-
off."8 Transaction set off is a cross-claim arising out of the same
transaction or one so closely related that it operates as a complete
or partial defeasance of the plaintiff's claim. Independent set-off,
as its name suggests, does not require any relationship between the
transactions out of which the cross claims arise.
Under the substantive provisions of the Convention,
transaction set-off-defined as defences and rights of set-off arising
from the original contract, or any other contract that was part of the
"same transaction" -is available to the debtor in a claim for
payment of the receivable by the assignee to the same extent as if
the claim had been made by the assignor."9  In other words, it
makes no difference whether the defence or set-off right arose
before or after the debtor received notification of the assignment.
In contrast, independent set-off -referred to in the Convention
simply as "other rights of set-off"-may be raised against the
assignee only if the right was "available" to the debtor at the time
notification of the assignment was received. °
The approach taken by the Convention to transaction set-off
reflects a widely-shared consensus at the national law level. 2 '
Nonetheless, the rule does not dispense with the need to resort to
national law. Recourse to national law will still be necessary to
determine what substantive defences and rights of set-off are
available to a debtor by way of transaction set-off, and to determine
when a related contract is considered to be sufficiently connected to
the original contract to constitute part of the "same transaction"
118. See, e.g., PHILIP WOOD, TITLE FINANCE, DERIVATIVES, SET-OFF AND
NETTING 101, 110 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).
119. UNCITRAL Convention article 18.1.
120. UNCITRAL Convention article 18.2.
121. See K6tz, supra note 37, at 89-91.
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and therefore qualify for transaction set-off. But which national
law?
The choice of law rule for assignee-debtor relations in article
29 of Chapter V does not explicitly cover set-off issues, and this
silence was deliberate. Nonetheless, transaction set-off is arguably
covered as an aspect of "the conditions under which the assignment
can be invoked against the debtor." Although the conflicts
literature on set-off is sparse, at least one commentator considers
this to be the result intended by art 12(2) of the Rome Convention
from which article 29 is derived.122 As a matter of logic and policy,
it is difficult to see what law other than the law governing the
original contract should govern defences and cross-claims arising
under that contract and any related transactions.
The appropriate law to govern the availability of independent
set-off rights is more problematic. The choice of law issue is
important in view of the significant absence of uniformity at the
substantive law level among different legal systems on such issues
as the pre-conditions to the availability of independent set-off
(must the debt have become payable before notification or is it
sufficient for the claim to have accrued?) and the manner in which
set-off is exercised if by self-help (e.g., automatic or by
declaration) . 3
It has been suggested that in principle, the question of whether
a claim may be discharged by independent set-off should be
governed by the law of the claim which the debtor asserts has been
discharged by set-off.124 Application of the law of the primary
claim, it is argued, would confer some measure of predictability of
result where one law allows set-off and the other does not. In the
context of a claim by the assignee against the debtor, this would
lead to application of the law governing the original contract.
In the view of others, such a choice of law rule would be
unfairly arbitrary. By definition, independent set-off comes from
an independent transaction or event which may have a different
governing law than that which governs the primary claim under the
original contract, and which may regulate the conditions for the
availability of set-off in a different fashion than would the law
governing the original contract. The only fair way to accommodate
this duality in governing laws, it has been suggested, is to apply a
cumulation of laws, i.e., independent set-off should be available
122. See WOOD, supra note 118, at 145.
123. See K6tz, supra note 37, at 91-92; WOOD, supra note 118, at 143.
124. See WOOD, supra note 118, at 144.
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only to the extent it is available under both the law governing the
primary claim and the law governing the independent cross-claim.'
E. Effectiveness of Assignments Contrary to a No-Assignment
Clauses
Under the Convention, an assignment is fully effective even if
a term in the original contract purports to prohibit or restricts its
assignment (an anti-assignment clause). The debtor retains a right
of action against the assignor for breach of the term, but the
assignment itself is valid, both as between the parties, and as against
the debtor.26
The approach taken by the Convention is not without
controversy. A debtor may have sound commercial reasons for
incorporating an anti-assignment clause in the contract. Yet if such
clauses were rigorously enforced, this would deprive businesses-
particularly small and medium sized businesses without sufficient
bargaining power against economically stronger customers-to use
what may be their most valuable assets to raise credit or capital.
These competing tensions have lead to wide variations in legal
systems on the appropriate treatment of anti-assignment clauses.27
In some, the statutory policy is broadly similar to the Convention.
In others, an assignment in breach of an anti-assignment clause is
still valid as between the parties, but cannot be enforced by the
assignee directly against the debtor.9  In still others, the anti-
125. Id. at 144.
126. See articles 9, 10.2-3. Article 18.3 further confirms that breach by the
assignor of an anti-assignment clause does not constitute a defence or give rise to a
right of set-off if the assignee claims payment of the receivable from the debtor.
127. See Ktz, supra note 37, at 64-70.
128. In Canada, this is the general rule under the Personal Property Security
Acts except for the Ontario PPSA: see, e.g., section 41(9) of the Saskatchewan
PPSA and section 41(10) of the New Brunswick PPSA. The rule is justified as
necessary to facilitate receivables financing, In France, anti-assignment clauses are
thought to be invalid, not so much in the interests of supporting access to
commercial credit, but as contrary to the long-standing strong French public policy
against restraints on the alienation of property. Italian law takes the same
approach. See Kotz, supra note 37, at 64-65.
129. This is the current position in the Canadian province of Ontario. See
Rodaro v. Royal Bank of Canada [2000] [QL] O.J. 272, approving Yablonski v.
Cawood (1997), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 65 at 76 (Sask. C.A.) (which held that even if a
contract contains a prohibition on assignment, the assignment would still be
effective as between assignor and assignee; such a prohibition merely prevents the
assignee from having direct recourse against the non consenting party to the
assigned contract). However, the Canadian Bar Association-Ontario Branch
recently recommended amendments designed to bring Ontario policy into
conformity with the more liberal policy found in the other PPSAs on this point.
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assignment clause nullifies the effectiveness of the assignment not
just as against the debtor but also between the assignee and
competing third party claimants (despite the fact that such a
contractual term is clearly aimed only at the protection of the
debtor) .130
In light of this controversy, the scope of the provisions of the
Convention nullifying the effects of assignment clauses is limited to
assignments of what might loosely be called ordinary trade
receivables.13 It follows that the effects of an anti-assignment
clause in the case of other assignments will instead be determined
by the law governing the original contract pursuant to article 29.
Article 29 may also have a role to play even in cases where the
assignment itself falls within the scope of the substantive anti-
assignment clause provisions of the Convention. If the application
of the Convention has not also been triggered as against the
debtor,'32 these provisions will only operate to ensure that the
assignment takes effect as between the assignor and assignee. They
cannot deprive the debtor of the benefit of any protection which
the law governing the original contract offers pursuant to the choice
of law rule in article 29. Article 29 is concerned with the assignee's
rights against the debtor, the aim being to protect the debtor
against an involuntary change in the law regulating those rights. It
follows that if the contract under which the receivable arises
contains a prohibition on assignment, and the law governing that
contract entitles the debtor to ignore the assignee's title or security
interest under a subsequent assignment in breach of that
prohibition, then the debtor should be able to invoke the protection
of that law, regardless of what the law governing the contract of
assignment may say.133
See Submission to the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations Concerning
the Personal Property Security Act 19-20 (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association-
Ontario, 21 Oct 1998). In the civil law province of Quebec, the position is
uncertain. The validity and effects of anti-assignment clauses are not addressed
explicitly in the Civil Code. However, some analysts believe that an assignment in
breach of an anti-assignment clause would be valid, not only as between the
assignor and assignee and as against third parties but also against the debtor, by
virtue of the general codal articles which limit the effectiveness of stipulations
which attempt to restrict the free alienation of property rights by contract. See
articles 1212-1217.
130. This is the general rule in German, Swiss and Austrian law. See Kotz,
supra note 3, at 65-67.
131. UNCITRAL Convention articles 9.3, 10.4.
132. UNCITRAL Convention article 1.3. And see the text under the sub-
heading "Scope of Application of the Conflicts Rules of the Convention" supra.
133. See GOODE, supra note 3 and Moshinsky, supra note 3 who make this
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For assignments falling wholly outside the Convention, article
29 will also determine the choice of law to govern the assignee's
rights as against the debtor in the face of an anti-assignment clause.
However, the debtor may also be able to rely on the law governing
the contract of assignment, pursuant to the choice of law rule in
article 28. If that law treats an assignment in breach of an anti-
assignment clause as a complete nullity even as between the parties,
then surely it is also a nullity as against the debtor, even where the
debtor's own law is less protective.
F. Statutory Prohibitions or Restrictions on Assignments
Issues relating to the effectiveness of an assignment, between
the parties and against third parties may also arise as a result of a
statutory prohibition on the assignment of certain classes of
receivables, e.g, future wages, pension entitlements, or family
maintenance payments owing to individual debtors, or payments
due under life insurance policies. Article 12(2) of the Rome
Convention refers issues of "assignability" to the law governing the
receivable and at least some analysts regard this as including issues
of assignability stemming from statutory restrictions. There are,
however, logical difficulties with that assumption. If the law
regulating the assignee's right to the receivable against the assignor
prohibits the assignment, then surely the assignee has no right to
the receivable against the debtor.
Happily, article 29 does not incorporate the confusing term
"assignability," and the Convention elsewhere explicitly confirms
that it is not intended to affect limitations on assignment arising
from law.34 This is appropriate. Most statutory prohibitions on
assignment are directed at the protection of the assignor or the
assignor's family, rather than the debtor. Consequently, their
territorial scope of operation would normally be limited to cases
involving an assignor resident within the enacting jurisdiction. It
follows that issues of assignability arising from the effect of
statutory prohibitions on assignment would normally be covered by
the choice of law governing the in rem effect of the assignment as
between the assignor and assignee without ever getting to the
choice of law issue covered by article 29 which is concerned with
the rights of the assignee under a valid assignment against the
debtor.
point in the context of the equivalent rule in article 12(2) of the Rome Convention.
134. UNCITRAL Convention article 8.3.
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IX. Concluding Observations
On the whole, the choice of law rules of the Convention
respond exceedingly well to contemporary currents of private
international law opinion in the light of commercial needs. This is
most dramatically seen in the designation of the law of the
assignor's location as the governing law for issues relating to the
priority of the assignee's interest against competing claimants, a
rule crafted to accommodate modern financing practices where
bulk assignments of present and future receivables are
commonplace.
The Convention nonetheless leaves open some areas of
uncertainty, perhaps inevitably. The issue of what law governs the
proprietary effectiveness of an assignment is most problematic in
this regard. From a pure choice of law perspective, the optimal
solution would be to subject the property aspects of an assignment
to the same law that governs priority. This is because, while
priority in the usual sense presupposes a valid assignment, the
issues of validity and priority are not so neatly separated in many
legal systems. Instead, the constitutive rules for a valid assignment
often incorporate elements aimed at the protection of both the
immediate parties and third parties, making it conceptually difficult
to cleanly separate the issues at the level of choice of law, and
objectionable to do so at the level of policy.
For assignments falling within the direct scope of the
Convention, however, such a separation is necessary. This is
because the Convention combines a substantive rule validating the
effectiveness of assignments of multiple and future receivables with
a choice of law rule for issues of priority. Consequently,
Contracting States, if confusion is to be avoided, will need to ensure
that their domestic laws on the effectiveness of such assignments
are liberalized to an equivalent degree. Otherwise their courts will
be left with the difficult task of having to deconstruct the priority
rules of the assignor's location to determine whether or not they are
overridden as indirectly impeding such assignments.
So, while the decision to adopt a choice of law solution to the
issue of priority was taken so as to avoid interference with domestic
priority policies, some interference was inevitable to accommodate
the consensus among Commission members on the wisdom of
endorsing the free assignability of the full range of present and
future receivables owing to an assignor. However, the interference
is minimal. The state in which the assignor is located remains free
to impose whatever level of policy restrictions on the priority or
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distributive effects of assignments of future and multiple receiv-
ables are feel to be necessary to protect competing assignees and
the assignor's creditors. All that is required is that the rule be
expressed in a way which avoids the a priori invalidation of such
assignments.
Designation of the assignor's law to control priority represents
a partial return to an earlier era of globalized trade in which
commercial transactions involving movable assets wherever located
were referred to a single governing law, that of the domicile of the
owner, the assignor in this context. We.are not likely, however, to
see the assignor's law resurrected to any equivalently compre-
hensive extent. While the Convention covers most types of
contract-generated receivables, it excludes a number of commer-
cially important categories, including bank deposits and receivables
arising out of investment securities and other financial assets or
instruments held with an intermediary. "6 The question of whether
and why a different specialized choice of law rule may be needed
for these excluded categories is the subject of another article. What
is important is that the UNCITRAL Convention has established
the assignor's law as the baseline rule for choice of law in
intangibles, shifting the burden of proof to those who wish to
advocate any deviation from the single governing law theory for
global assignments which underpins the rule.
135. As reflected in the quote from the 1795 English decision in Phillips v.
Hunter reproduced at the beginning of this article: see above footnote 1.
136. UNCITRAL Convention article 4.2.
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